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Abstract
This paper introduces uncertainty into a fiscal projection model which incorpo-
rates population ageing along with a number of feedback eﬀects. When fiscal policy
responds in order to achieve a target debt ratio, feedback eﬀects modify the intended
outcomes. The feedbacks include the eﬀect on labour supply in response to changes
in tax rates, changes in the country risk premium in response to higher public debt
ratios, endogenous changes in the rate of productivity growth and savings. Stochas-
tic projections of a range of policy responses are produced, allowing for uncertainty
regarding the world interest rate, productivity growth and the growth rates of two
components of per capita government expenditure. The probability of exceeding a
given debt ratio in each projection year, using a particular tax or expenditure policy,
can then be evaluated. Policy implications are briefly discussed.
∗We are grateful to Martin Fukac, Mark Holmes and Renee Philip for comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.
†New Zealand Treasury.
‡Victoria University of Wellington and New Zealand Treasury.
§New Zealand Productivity Commission.
1
1 Introduction
It has long been recognised that the provision of useful policy advice benefits from the
construction of projections which describe the possible paths of relevant variables, under
clearly stated assumptions. In New Zealand, this is a formal requirement of the Public
Finance Act 1989, which requires Treasury to produce a statement on the Crown’s long-
term fiscal position at least every four years. These statements provide 40-year projections,
identify challenges that are likely to face future governments, such as those arising from
society’s ageing population.1 Such projections are crucial in assessing fiscal sustainability
and the required adjustments in the face of projected debt growth: the issues are discussed
by Buckle and Cruickshank (2014) in the New Zealand context.2
Projections are obviously subject to a number of limitations. For example, in reviewing
the Treasury’s modelling work and its Long Term Fiscal Statement (LTFS), Ter-Minassain
(2014, p. 50) suggested that, ‘the Treasury should continue to refine its analytical tools’
and ‘it would be desirable to present, in future versions of the LTFS, scenarios with diﬀerent
dynamic paths of the key macroeconomic assumptions, to allow for plausible feedbacks from
the growth of the debt’. In this spirit, a long-term model incorporating a small number of
feedbacks has recently been developed by Creedy and Scobie (2015).
A further serious limitation is the need to deal explicitly with the inevitable and con-
siderable uncertainty involved in making projections, particularly over such a long period.
This was stressed in the review of the Treasury’s most recent Long Term Fiscal Statement,
by the Controller and Auditor General; see Provost (2013). The review argued that:
‘Although a single projection makes it easier for a reader to understand, I am
concerned that the level of uncertainty implicit in the projection may not be
readily understood by readers of the 2013 Statement. I would have liked to see
the Treasury make more use of sensitivity analysis in the 2013 Statement to
demonstrate this inherent uncertainty.’
However, sensitivity analysis, especially where a range of variables is involved, does
1For previous reports see The Treasury (2006, 2009, 2013a).
2Early definitions and measures were proposed by Blanchard et al. (1990). For a non-technical discussion
of issues, see Schick (2005). The approach adopted by the European Union is set out in detail in European
Commission (2006). For an example of its use, see also Kleen and Pettersson (2012). A recent review of
approaches is by Pradelli (2012).
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not attach a probability to alternative outcomes. For this reason, stochastic projections —
making explicit assumptions about the relevant distributions — are preferred.3
The aim of the present paper is thus to examine stochastic tax revenue, expenditure and
government debt projections building on the model of Creedy and Scobie (2015). Rather
than attempting to capture all the details involved in the many types of expenditure and tax,
that model uses a much more aggregative approach than that of the Treasury’s Long Term
Fiscal Model.4 It has only four types of expenditure in addition to debt servicing costs, and a
simple proportional income tax function (including interest income). A Goods and Services
Tax (GST) is applied uniformly to all consumption expenditure. Various feedback eﬀects
are modelled using reduced-form specifications rather than explicit optimising behaviour.
The model nevertheless contains a suﬃcient amount of detail to enable a range of policy
responses to be examined.
The basic model is set out briefly in Section 2; further details are in Appendix A. As it
would be far too cumbersome to allow all variables in the model to be stochastic, just four key
variables of the model are subject to uncertainty. These are two (of the four) expenditure
components, the world interest rate and the rate of productivity growth. The approach
involves using information about variability in the past to form the basis of expectations
about future variability.
Section 3 presents information about the values of these four components of the model
over time. This section also describes the method used to carry out the Monte Carlo stud-
ies. The ‘benchmark’ projections, where no policy changes are imposed over the projection
period, are presented in Section 4. The model is used in Section 5 to examine the impli-
cations of adopting several income tax policy changes designed to achieve a specified debt
ratio by the end of the forty year projection period. Comparisons are made with results
using the deterministic version of the model. Section 5 examines the implications of a higher
productivity growth rate. Conclusions are in Section 6.
The advantage of the stochastic projections is that it is possible to form probability
statements about ranges of the debt ratio in each year, in particular the probability that
any given debt ratio is exceeded. Such probability statements are, of course, conditional
on the model and the specification of uncertainty being correct. It should be recognised
3One component of the fiscal projections, stochastic population and social expenditure projections for
New Zealand were first made by Creedy and Scobie (2005), and the methodology was followed more recently
by Creedy and Makale (2014).
4For a description of the Treasury model and projections, see Bell and Rodway (2014).
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that a much wider range of uncertainties are relevant in practice. Furthermore, population
projections are themselves subject to uncertainty, although deterministic projections are
used here. It is sometimes suggested that the discussion of uncertainty surrounding fiscal
projections merely provides a distraction from the ‘main message’ — usually seen as the
need for immediate action. However, it is argued here that recognition of the considerable
uncertainty involved is indeed a crucial part of the ‘message’ and itself raises important
policy questions. These are discussed briefly in the concluding section.
2 A Description of The Model
A requirement of the model is that it is capable of projecting the paths of government
revenue and expenditure, and therefore debt, under a range of assumptions and feedback
eﬀects. To make the model as transparent as possible, a high level of aggregation is used.
It is clearly necessary to allow demographic variations in both population size and its age
composition to influence government expenditure and revenue. While detailed demographic
projections are used, distinctions are drawn only between those of ‘working age’, ‘retirement
age’ and those below working age.
The basic structure of the model is described in Figure 1: further details are in Appendix
A and Creedy and Scobie (2015). The shaded boxes indicate components that influence other
variables: these include the income tax and GST structure, the incentive eﬀect of taxes,
the demographic structure of the population, and productivity and expenditure growth
rates. The items in bold font are, along with the debt levels, the main aggregates of total
government revenue and expenditure. Feedback eﬀects are indicated by the dashed lines
connecting boxes.
The generation of income changes from one year to the next is described down the left-
hand side of the diagram which, in turn, leads to tax revenue. There is therefore no attempt
to treat the production side of the economy explicitly. The model contains no explicit wage
rate, nor does it deal with labour and capital inputs into production. A ‘base level’ of
productivity is taken as exogenously given and, as explained below, productivity changes
can arise from growth in public expenditure on health and education per person, which
is considered to augment human capital. Government expenditure is described down the
central part of the diagram. Starting from per capita values for four expenditure components
(welfare benefits for the retired; other welfare benefits per person; expenditure on health
4
Figure 1: Outline of the Model
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and education; other social spending), along with the relevant growth rates, the total value
of expenditure is influenced by the age structure of the population. The generation of debt
over time is then indicated on the right-hand side of the diagram. All variables are in real
terms. The income tax is a simple proportional tax, with constant average and marginal
rates, and the GST system is considered to apply to all expenditure.5
The four feedback eﬀects modelled are indicated by dashed lines. Taxes have adverse
incentive eﬀects which influence employment income. Expenditure on health and education
has a (lagged) eﬀect on productivity growth. The government debt ratio influences the
interest risk premium. The assumption is made that the same interest rate applies to all
debt, so that debt eﬀectively involves the issue of one-period bonds. Finally, the interest
rate (the sum of the world rate and the risk premium) aﬀects the saving rate.6
The calibration of the model involves setting a large number of initial variables and
parameter values, obtained using an extensive range of New Zealand data (see Creedy
and Scobie, Tables 2 to 9). An important feature of the model — when the feedback and
uncertainty features are ‘turned oﬀ’ — is that it produces ‘benchmark’ forty-year projections
of the government debt ratio that closely match those produced by the considerably more
disaggregated Treasury Long Term Fiscal Model. In the benchmark case, growth rates and
other policy variables (such as tax rates) are held constant. An absence of feedback eﬀects
implies that the economy can be allowed to reach any debt ratio and then brought back to
a target level by an appropriate tax and expenditure policy. However, the feedback eﬀects
considered here — particularly those aﬀecting the risk premium and labour supply incentives
— make recovery from very high debt ratios extremely diﬃcult.
3 Introducing Uncertainty
This section introduces uncertainty into the deterministic form of the model. The structure
of the model itself — such as the nature of the basic relationships involved — is not considered
to be subject to uncertainty. The parameters of the various reduced-form relationships
governing the feedbacks and endogenous changes are assumed to be known and fixed. The
5The use of fiscal drag to increase tax revenues over time is thus not a possible policy option in the
model. The possibility of the government monetising the debt and inflating is thus also not considered here.
6Debt ratios up to about 150 per cent of GDP produce small (linear) increases in the risk premium.
Beyond this, the rate increases rapidly (and quadratically). In the stochastic projections reported below,
the risk premium was in fact capped at 15 per cent to prevent results becoming too explosive (and thereby
distorting the mean and median in particular).
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limited nature of the uncertainty modelled therefore needs to be kept in mind, though
there are substantial lessons obtained by departing from the deterministic approach that is
characteristic of the majority of projection models.
Although the model has a fairly high level of aggregation compared with the Treasury’s
LTFM, there are nevertheless many variables for which the time path is uncertain. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the present paper is limited to considering just four variables.
These are two of the four expenditure components, the world interest rate and the rate of
productivity growth. These were selected for examination on the grounds that they are
important determinants of the time path of the debt ratio and have been subject to consid-
erable variability over time. The eﬀect of allowing these four variables to be stochastic is
nevertheless suﬃcient to demonstrate the importance of dealing explicitly with uncertainty.
One approach to dealing with uncertainty is to rely on a set of a priori assumptions
about the distributions of the relevant variables.7 Assumptions about the form of the joint
distribution of the variables may be based on considerations relating to the structure of the
economy, policy settings and vulnerability to a range of exogenous shocks. Such assumption
may be more or less informed by past events. For example, the view may be taken that
the past is not necessarily a reliable guide to future variability given a range of institutional
and other changes. However, this is not the approach adopted here.
In the present context, the question raised is: what are the implications for the likely
path of the debt ratio if future variability is thought to be similar to that observed in
the past? In the absence of strong reasons for imposing other a priori specifications, past
history — while obviously not precisely repeated — is regarded as a reasonable starting point.
The method used here does not explicitly model discrete catastrophic, or beneficial, events.
However, to the extent that such events took place within the past years observed, their
eﬀects on the relevant variables are implied. The approach thus assumes that such events
are no more or less likely than in the past.
7An alternative to stochastic projections can sometimes be used where there is a long series of annual
projections, based on data revisions for some variables relating to before the projection period, as well as
outcomes of other variables. The variation revealed by such a series provides information about uncertainty
associated with projections.
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3.1 Past Variations
Historical evidence relating to productivity growth, the world interest rate, and the two
expenditure (per person) categories is shown respectively in Figures 2, 3 and Figure 4.8
The historical time period considered is forty years, the same length of time for which
projections are required.
Using these data it is possible to produce frequency distributions of values over the forty-
year period. The resulting histograms (not shown here) do not clearly follow any familiar
form. One approach may be to use mixture distributions to capture particular features of
the distributions. However, in addition to the complexity involved, particularly in dealing
with correlations among variables, such distributions would need to be truncated.9
Figure 2: Labour Productivity Growth 1973 to 2013
Table 1 provides summary information about the distributions of the four variables over
8Expenditure in nominal terms is obtained from http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/data. This is
converted to real expenditure by deflating by the CPI: see http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/m1/).
Finally, this is converted to a per capita basis using Historical population estimates as at 30 June: 1972-1990:
De facto population and 1991-2014: Estimated resident population.
See: http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/historical-
population-tables.aspx)
Real interest rates are for 10 year US Treasury bonds: see www.economagic.com/fedstl.htm. Labour
productivity is defined as GDP per hour worked. Total hours worked seasonally adjusted are from
Household Labour Force Survey (lhhwzq) and real GDP (ngdpp_zq) both from Statistics New Zealand,
http://www.stats.govt.nz/.
9Allowing values to be randomly drawn from the extreme tail of a distribution, however thin, can cause
severe problems. In particular, the relationship between the risk premium and the debt ratio produces a
rapid increase in the premium for debt ratios exceeding about 1.5 times GDP.
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Figure 3: World Real Interest Rate 1973 to 2013
Figure 4: Expenditure Growth Rates 1973 to 2013
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the forty year period 1973 to 2013. For a symmetric distribution, skewness (the ratio of the
third moment about the mean to the cube of standard deviation) is zero. Hence it can be
seen that the growth rates of health and education spending and productivity are negatively
skewed while the other two variables are positively skewed. The excess kurtosis measured
is relative to the standard normal distribution which has a kurtosis measure of 3; it is thus
equal to the ratio of the fourth moment about the mean to the fourth power of the standard
deviation, minus 3. Hence health and eduction, other social spending, and productivity
growth are more peaked than the normal distribution, while the world real interest rate is
flatter than a normal distribution.
Table 1: Summary Measures of Distributions: 1973-2013
Growth rate of expenditure on Productivity World real
Other social Health and growth rate interest rate
expenditure Education ( per cent)
Mean 0.0151 0.0209 0.0106 2.1763
Variance 0.0112 0.0020 0.0005 7.0509
Coeﬀ of Variation 7.009 2.042 2.109 1.220
Skewness 0.1514 -0.3000 -0.3850 0.1532
Kurtosis (excess) 0.1208 0.6852 0.6087 -0.2445
Table 2 reports the correlations between the variables. This shows, for example, that
two expenditure growth rates are slightly negatively correlated with the world interest rate.
More important are the positive correlation between the two growth rates, along with the
positive correlation between the growth of expenditure on health and education and the
productivity growth rate, and between the latter and the world real interest rate.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Distributions: 1973-2013
Growth rates of: Word real
Other social Health and interest rate
expenditure education Productivity ( per cent)
Other social expend 1 — — —
Health and Education 0.2884 1 — —
Productivity growth 0.0862 0.2104 1 —
World real interest rate (%) -0.0844 -0.0794 0.2856 1
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3.2 Generating Stochastic Variables
In order to capture the complex correlations between variables and the precise forms of their
distributions, without having to estimate a fully specified joint distribution, the following
approach was used. This was designed to capture the historical variation by sampling from
the empirical distributions over the period 1973 to 2013, rather than taking random draws
from specific functional forms of the relevant distributions.
First, each empirical distribution was transformed to ensure that the respective geomet-
ric means are the same as the parameter values imposed in the deterministic projections
examined by Creedy and Scobie (2015).10 The method then involved taking a random
selection of short ‘blocks’ of years, in moving over the 40 year projection period. The main
properties of the empirical data of interest are the cross-correlations among variables and
the serial correlation that is also evident in the diagrams. The first property was preserved
by selecting data from the same past year for each variable. Hence, if 1985 is selected for
one variable, the 1985 values are used for all other variables. The second property was
covered by selecting a sequential run of years and randomly drawing a starting point and
run length.
Specifically, an initial run length was first obtained by taking a random draw from a
uniform distribution over the integers three to seven. Hence each ‘block’ of years is allowed
to vary from between three and seven years inclusive. Then, given the selected run length,
the starting year was obtained by taking a random draw from a uniform distribution defined
over those starting points which, given the run length, provide years that are completed
within the dataset.11 For example, at the start of the projection period, suppose the first
random draw (from between 3 and 7 inclusive) gives 4, while the second draw give the year
1988. The values would be taken from the four (adjusted) distributions in the four years
1988, 1999, 2000, 2001.
In carrying out the Monte Carlo analysis, 2000 sets of stochastic projections were
obtained. For each projection year, the arithmetic mean and median of the resulting distrib-
ution of debt ratios were calculated, along with the quartiles and the 5 and 95 percentile.
10That is, if  denotes the value of a particular variable in period , and  is the value of the variable in the
deterministic case (no stochastics), the transformed value is obtained as: {(1 + ) (1 + )  (1 + )}−1.
The deterministic case is then equivalent to all  = .
11Further sensitivity analysis was carried out by sampling using only three and four year blocks of data.
The main results are unchanged although there are minor diﬀerences in the percentiles.
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4 The Benchmark Case
As mentioned above, for the benchmark case where no policy responses take place over the
period, the deterministic form of the model produced a projection for the debt ratio in New
Zealand that closely matches that of the more disaggregated Treasury Long Term Fiscal
Model. This produces the ‘expanding debt’ case that is recognised as being unrealistic and
which corresponds in no sense to a forecast. For this case, the stochastic form of the model
gives rise to Figure 5, which shows the time profiles of the mean and median debt ratio,
two measures of location, along with various percentiles, The dotted lines are the 5 and
95 percentiles while the dashed lines are the two quartiles. The median value for the final
projection year is a debt ratio of 143 per cent of GDP. This is similar to the deterministic
case, where Creedy and Scobie (2015) found a debt ratio of (approximately) 150 per cent
of GDP in the final year.
The range shown by the 5 and 95 percentiles in the terminal year is vast. The mean
is clearly strongly influenced in later years (after about 2033) by the long ‘right-hand’ tail
of the debt ratio distribution as the distributions become more positively skewed as well as
more dispersed. This is largely influenced by the dispersion of expenditure as a proportion
of GDP, which is influenced by the rapid increase in debt servicing costs in the high-debt
ranges, as the risk premium rises steeply. The spread shown in Figure 5 clearly underscores
the considerable uncertainty involved in making projections over such a long period.
Figure 5: Benchmark Stochastic Projections: No Policy Responses
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Figure 6: Probability of Exceeding Given Debt Ratios in Each Projection Year
Figure 6 shows the variation over time in the probability of exceeding three debt ratios, of
20, 50 and 100 per cent of GDP. Given that the starting point involves a debt level around 25
per cent of GDP, the probability of exceeding the first ratio is close to 1 in early years, while
the probability of exceeding 50 or 100 per cent is zero. But as the dispersion increases, the
probabilities of exceeding the higher debt ratios increase, while the probability of exceeding
the lower ratio first necessarily falls and then rises. A feature of these probability profiles
is that at the end of the projection period the probabilities converge at around a debt ratio
of 60 per cent. This arises because of the huge dispersion of the distribution, so that very
little of the area under the distribution is contained between the 20 and 100 per cent debt
ratio values.
Consider the eﬀect of increasing or decreasing the degree of uncertainty, reflected in the
dispersions of the four variables concerned. Figure 7 illustrates two hypothetical distribu-
tions of the debt ratio in a particular year, where distribution A reflects more uncertainty
than distribution B. These two distributions are shown as symmetric, with increased uncer-
tainty resulting in a mean-preserving spread. In practice the distributions are skewed and
the way in which the degree of uncertainty is specified aﬀects the outcome. However, they
illustrate a property that holds in the present case. Consider the lower debt ratio, .
Letting  denote the debt ratio and  and  the probabilities relating to the two dis-
tributions, it can be seen that (  )  (  ). However, for the higher
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debt ratio,  , the inequality is reversed and (  )  (  ). Hence the
probability of exceeding a relatively low debt ratio falls as uncertainty increases, while the
probability of exceeding a relatively high value rises as uncertainty increases.
Figure 7: An Increase in Uncertainty
A further implication arises from these comparisons. Suppose the actual degree of uncer-
tainty is greater than is thought; that is, distribution A reflects the actual uncertainty
whereas B is generated from the assumptions used to generate the Monte Carlo experiment.
In that case, the conclusions will be too pessimistic (attributing too high a probability) about
exceeding low debt ratios and too optimistic (attributing too low a probability) about high
debt ratios.
As an example, suppose the only uncertainty arises from variations in the world real
interest rate which, as seen above, has a relatively low coeﬃcient of variation. Figure 8
shows the corresponding profiles over time of the probability of exceeding the three debt
levels considered. All three probabilities approach unity by the end of the period because of
the low dispersion of the distribution of the ratio of debt to GDP, with just the one variable
being stochastic. The ‘dip’ in the profile for the probability of exceeding 20 per cent arises
because of the slight reduction in the debt ratio profiles in the early years of the projection
period.
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Figure 8: Probability of Exceeding Debt Ratios where Uncertainty Arises fromWorld Inter-
est Rate Only
5 Meeting a Debt Target
It has been stressed that the benchmark projections provide, rather than any kind of fore-
cast, information about fiscal sustainability and an indication of a likely need for future
policy changes. An important question — to be examined in future research — concerns
the policy implications of providing information about the uncertainty associated with the
projections, in addition to the deterministic case. The present section instead examines the
implications for the projected time path of the debt ratio of two simple policy responses
designed to achieve a specified debt ratio target by the end of the projection period. The
first policy, discussed in subsection 5.1, is the widely-discussed tax smoothing option, which
implies a period when government surpluses are obtained. The incentive for tax smoothing
arises from the fact that the excess burden of taxation increases disporportionately with the
tax rate, so that a constant rate minimises the burden. An early modern discussion of tax
smoothing is Barro (1979). Armstrong et al. (2007) also highlight the concave nature of the
government’s revenue function, arising from adverse incentive eﬀects. Davis and Fabling
(2002) stress the ability of the government to obtain a rate of return, during periods of
surplus, in excess of the cost of borrowing, although this feature is not examined here.
The second policy, examined in subsection 5.2, involves using a gradual tax increase
to achieve the same target debt ratio. The objective in comparing the policies is not at
this stage to consider any type of optimal policy, but rather to compare the time paths of
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debt and the associated uncertainty, and also to compare results with those obtained when
uncertainty is neglected.
5.1 Tax Smoothing
In the case where there is no uncertainty, Creedy and Scobie (2015) found that to achieve a
20 per cent debt ratio in 2053 using income tax smoothing, whereby a higher constant tax
rate is imposed over the period, the tax rate needs to be increased to 18.5 per cent from
the benchmark income tax rate of 16.25 per cent.12 If the same policy, of imposing a rate of
18.5 per cent over the period, is imposed, the resulting stochastic projections are shown in
Figure 9. As in the benchmark case, the dispersion of the probability distribution rapidly
increases over time. The median debt ratio turns out to be about half of the ‘desired’ 20 per
cent. Nevertheless, the median is increasing at the end of the period and would be expected
to reach 20 per cent soon afterwards. The associated probabilities of exceeding 20, 50 and
100 per cent of GDP in each year are shown in Figure 10.
Figure 9: Tax Smoothing with Income Tax Rate of 18.5 Per Cent
An alternative question which the stochastic projections are able to answer concerns how
much the constant tax-smoothing income tax rate needs to be increased in order to achieve
a specified probability of the debt ratio exceeding various levels. The result of gradually
increasing the tax rate is shown in Table 3 for the final projection year, 2053. For example,
if the income tax rate were to be increased from the benchmark case of 16.25 per cent to 20
12If only GST is adjusted, it needs to be raised, from the benchmark value of 15 per cent, to 18 per cent
and held constant over the projection period.
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Figure 10: Probability of Exceeding Debt Ratios with Income Tax Rate of 18.5
Table 3: Probability of Exceeding Debt Ratios in 2053 as Income Tax Rate Varies
Tax rate Ratio of debt to GDP ( per cent)
( per cent) 20 50 100 Mean
16.25 56 52 44 204
17 49 45 38 132
18 41 37 31 46
19 34 30 25 -31
20 27 25 20 -101
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per cent, the probability of the debt exceeding 20 per cent of GDP in 2053 would fall from
56 per cent to 27 per cent. This halving of the probability is similar for that of the debt
ratio exceeding 50 per cent and 100 per cent of GDP. The relatively small diﬀerence in the
probabilities, for the diﬀerent debt ratios, arises for the reason explained above, namely that
there is a very large dispersion in the final distribution. However, the associated variation
in the expected value of the debt ratio in 2053 is huge: it falls from a ratio of 204 per cent
in the benchmark case to a surplus of 101 per cent of GDP with the income tax rate of 20
per cent.
Figure 11: Gradual Tax Rate Increase of 0.14 Percentage Points each Year
5.2 An Increasing Income Tax Rate
In the deterministic case, it was found that a gradual increase in the income tax rate by
0.14 percentage points each year, so that the rate reaches 21.9 per cent in 2053, would result
in a debt ratio of 20 per cent of GDP by the end of the projection period. In contrast to
the tax-smoothing case which implies a period of surplus, there is less variation in the debt
ratio over the projection period. It falls to a low of about 10 per cent of GDP in the middle
of the projection period.
If the same policy of gradually increasing the tax rate over time is followed, the resulting
stochastic projections are illustrated in Figure 11. In this case the median debt ratio in 2053
is also about half of the value (of 20 per cent) obtained by the deterministic projections.
Figure 12 shows the associate probabilities of exceeding three debt ratios in each year. These
18
are similar to those obtained in the tax smoothing case.
Figure 12: Probability of Exceeding Debt Ratios with Gradually Increasing Income Tax
Rate
6 Conclusions
This paper has added uncertainty to the projection model introduced by Creedy and Scobie
(2015), which allowed for a limited number of feedback eﬀects in a model designed to
examine fiscal sustainability in New Zealand over a long period. These modifications have
been made in response to public criticisms of the Treasury’s Long Term Fiscal Statement
(2014). Faced with the inevitable uncertainty associated with future values of important
variables in the model, the approach taken has been to use stochastic projections in a Monte
Carlo exercise. This has the substantial advantage over sensitivity analyses of being able to
generate probability statements about projected debt ratios.
The approach taken was to suppose that the observed variablity in four central vari-
ables (the world interest rate, the base rate of productivity growth, and growth rates of
two per capita expenditure categories) over the forty-year period 1973 to 2013, provided
a reasonable guide to future variability. Instead of specifying explicit functional forms for
the distributions, random observations were taken from ‘blocks’ (of random length) of the
past data. In this way the serial correlations and correlations among the variables were
retained. Uncertainty regarding the structure of the projection model itself, and the form
of the various feedback relationships (as well as the many other variables which cannot be
19
known with certainty), was ignored. The projected distributions can therefore be regarded
as being conditional on these assumptions.
Despite the limited nature of the uncertainty modelled here, it was found that the
projections of the debt ratio over the forty-year period to 2053 are subject to extremely
large variations, as well as being positively skewed in the later years. The results suggest
that the basic deterministic projections provide a very partial view about future prospects,
despite not departing substantially from the median values obtained from the stochastic
projections.
These results raise the important question of the appropriate policy response. Faced
with deterministic projections showing a divergence between expenditure and revenue, and
thus an expanding debt ratio, it is sometimes argued that policy responses should be made
as early as possible, although such a recommendation is subject to inter-generational equity
and other considerations. However, with uncertainty, it is possible that there is an option
value of waiting until some of the uncertainty is resolved, particularly where policy changes
involve costs that cannot be reversed.13
The framework may be compared with the consideration of investment in a multi-period
project where the future returns are not known with certainty, there is a non-recoverable
sunk cost of investing in the first period and there exists the option of waiting until later
periods before making the investment.14 The sunk cost consists of any fixed costs which
cannot be recovered (such as the diﬀerence between the cost of investing in specific equip-
ment and its resale value) and the foregone value of waiting and obtaining more information
(the option value).15
In the present context it has been seen that an increase in the tax rate in the first
period, to accumulate a fund that can be used in the event of a future possible expenditure
requirement, involves a sunk cost and therefore possibly a positive option value.16 This sunk
13In the present context early tax changes impose costs on a given generation, which cannot necessarily
be compensated by future changes. The excess burden of taxation provides a further example. Using a very
simple tax and expenditure model, the role of option values was explored by Ball and Creedy (2014).
14See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Pindyck (2008).
15In the context of health and long-term care under demographic uncertainty, Lassila and Valkonen (2004,
p. 637) find that the longer the time horizon, ‘the virtues of using continuously updated demographic
information to evaluate future expenditures become evident’.
16The danger that a precautionary fund will be raided by a future government, stressed long ago by
Ricardo in the context of the British Sinking Fund, is not considered here. Davis and Fabling (2002)
model ‘expenditure creep’and report that it can completely erode the eﬃciency gains from tax smoothing.
They conclude that, ‘strong fiscal institutions are a prerequisite for achieving the welfare gains from tax
smoothing’ (2002, p. 16).
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cost arises partly from the nature of the excess burden of taxation which increases more
than proportionately with the tax rate. A subsequent reduction in the tax rate, if the extra
revenue is not needed, allows the later tax rate to be reduced below the value needed for the
other (fully anticipated) tax-financed expenditure. But this cannot fully recover the extra
excess burden from the initial tax increase. However, the present context does not require,
as in the standard investment framework, a given lumpy amount of investment (such as the
construction of a factory) in the period in which it is decided to invest. Here it is possible in
the first period to commit to a policy which involves only a small increase in the tax rate,
leaving the additional (uncertain) revenue to be obtained by a higher tax rate increase in
future, if this turns out to be necessary.
Constraints on flexibility of government policy, such as the ability to change tax rates
and expenditure, are also relevant. Auerbach and Hassett (1998, 2002) suggested that,
faced with uncertainty, the inability to have frequent policy changes suggests early action.
However, inaction may be chosen because of the inability to reverse any adverse eﬀects on
particular groups. They concluded (1998, p. 23) that, ‘the optimal policy response over
time might best be characterized by great caution in general, but punctuated by occasional
periods of apparent irresponsibility’. The present model will thus be extended in future
research to consider the question of optimal policy responses under uncertainty.
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Appendix A: Formal Statement of The Model
This Appendix provides a description of the main components of the model.
1 Government Debt
Let denote debt at the end of time period, , for  = 1   , where0 is the debt inherited
from the past. If  is the domestic interest rate at time , equivalent to the government
bond rate, then the debt servicing cost at time , denoted , is given by  = −1. The
interest rate depends on the world interest rate, , which is assumed to be constant, and a
risk premium, ,so that  = +. Government expenditure includes welfare spending,
, which consists of untaxed transfer payments of , received by non-pensioners, and
aggregate (untaxed) superannuation benefits of .17 The levels per person are denoted
 ∗ and  ∗, so that if  and  denote the number in receipt of the pension and
welfare benefits respectively,  =  ∗ and  =  ∗.
All other spending at  is denoted by . This is composed of spending on publicly-
provided goods such as health and education, , and other expenditure, , so that
 =  +. The former may be considered as investment in human capital, while the
other expenditure has no direct impact on individuals. As explained below,  is assumed
to have no direct impact on the labour supply, and thus incomes, of individuals. While 
does not have a direct impact, it influences income via its eﬀect on productivity growth.
Variations in these spending categories are produced by variations in per capita amounts,
∗ and ∗ and variations in the total population, : hence  = 
¡∗ +∗¢.
Total government expenditure, , is thus:
 = + + −1 (A.1)
Define  as total tax revenue from direct and indirect taxes, so that debt in period  is:
 = −1 + − (A.2)
17In practice New Zealand Superannuation is taxable. However, this is allowed for in the calibration of
the model, discussed below.
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2 Income
Define  as total ‘potential income’ in period , from labour and rental income. To allow
for productivity growth at the rate , write:
 = (1 + )−1 (A.3)
Let  indicate the ratio of actual to potential income, so that aggregate income can be
written as  = .
Assume that all forms of income are taxed at the same rate. Then if  denotes aggregate
savings at time, , as defined above, these are all assumed to be invested at the going rate,
. Capital, , is thus  = −1 + −1. As this refers to the accumulation of savings, no
depreciation is applied. As discussed above, the production side of the economy, including
investment and capital accumulation, is not modelled explicitly. Hence aggregate income
is:
 =  + −1 (A.4)
For simplicity, this assumes that the borrowing and lending rates are equal, and the same
both for the government and individuals. The above specification does not allow for popu-
lation growth. A simple adjustment is made by raising  by a proportion that depends
on the growth rate, from period − 1 to , of the population above working age.
3 Tax Revenue
Suppose that income tax is simply a constant proportion,  , of taxable income. Revenue is
also obtained from indirect taxes. Define  as indirect tax revenue at , from a GST/VAT
type of system, where  is the tax-exclusive rate applied to all expenditure. However,
indirect taxes applied to  are ignored here since these are netted out in the government’s
budget constraint. The tax-inclusive indirect tax rate is  (1 + ).
Savings, , are made from net income. Assume that all transfer payments, , are con-
sumed. Then if savings are a constant proportion, , of post-tax income,  =  (1−  )
and indirect tax revenue is:
 =
∙ (1− ) (1−  )
1 + 
¸
 +
∙ 
1 + 
¸
 (A.5)
Total tax revenue, , consists of income tax, plus , plus other revenue, . The latter
is specified as an amount per capita, ∗, which is subject to an exogenous growth rate,
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along with growth arising from the increase each period in the population above working
age. Substituting for  in  =   +  + gives:
 =  ∗ +
∙ 
1 + 
¸
 + (A.6)
where  ∗ is the overall eﬀective income tax rate, given by:
 ∗ =   +  (1− ) (1−  )(1 + ) (A.7)
Hence  ∗ reflects the combined eﬀect of the income and consumption tax rates.
4 Feedback Eﬀects
The risk premium at time  is considered to be a function of−1−1 = −1. Evidence
suggests that the risk premium increases only slowly for relatively small values of this ratio,
but increases rapidly once it exceeds a value of ∗.18 For −1  ∗, suppose:
 = 1 + 2 + 3 ()2 (A.8)
and for −1 ≤ ∗ the premium increases linearly:
 = 1 + 2∗ + 3 (∗)2 − 0 (∗ −−1) (A.9)
Suppose the saving rate, , depends on the interest rate. In principle this eﬀect is
ambiguous, but it is assumed here that the interest-elasticity of savings is positive. This is
reflected in a reduced-form relationship:
 = 11 + 12 (A.10)
with 12  0. Furthermore, the savings rate enters into the determination of the eﬀective
tax rate,  ∗ , as shown in (A.7).
To capture adverse incentive eﬀects of the tax and transfer system, suppose the variable,
, is a function of the tax rate, so that  =  ( ∗ ), with  ∗  0. Suppose the elasticity
of taxable income, defined with respect to the eﬀective net-of-tax rate, 1−  ∗ , is constant.
Then:
 ( ∗ ) = 8 (1−  ∗ )9 (A.11)
18For example, see Ostry et al. (2010). The response of the risk premium to debt ratios is also discussed
by Fookes (2011) and Lees (2013) in the New Zealand context.
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Investments in the quality of human capital through both health and education enhance
productivity. Suppose changes in  depends on previous growth of the per capita public
expenditure component, ∗. The change in  depends on the change  years previously,
that is in ∗−. If a dot above a variable indicates a proportionate change:
˙ = 4
1 + 5˙
∗−
6
(A.12)
This logistic form captures decreasing returns. If  is a ‘base level’ of productivity change:
 =  (1 + ˙) (A.13)
5 Details of Model Calibration
Despite the simplicity of the model, suitable orders of magnitude of many of the variables
can be obtained from National Income data and demographic projections. The data sources
and values are set out in detail in Creedy and Scobie (2015). Parameter values used for the
various functions are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Benchmark Parameter Values
Risk premium: For −1  ∗,  = 1 + 2−1 + 3 (−1)2
For −1 ≤ ∗,  = 1 + 2∗ + 3 (∗)2 − 0 (∗ −−1)
0 0.026
1 -0.03
2 0.015
3 0.0015
∗ 1.0
Productivity growth changes: ˙ = 4
µ
1 + 5˙
∗−
6
¶
4 0.6
5 35
6 0.00005
 0.015 5
Incentive eﬀects of taxation:  ( ) = 8 (1−  ∗ )98 1.0
9 0.5
Saving rate:  = 11 + 12
11 0.03
12 0.0833
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Appendix B: A Productivity Change
Creedy and Scobie (2015) found that increasing the basic rate from 1.5 per cent per year
to 1.94 per cent, the deterministic model resulted in a debt ratio of 20 per cent of GDP in
2053. The eﬀect of changing the base level in the stochastic model is shown in Figure 13.
This involves adjusting the productivity growth rates over the period 1973 to 2013 so that
their geometric mean is equal to 1.94. The probabilities of exceeding specified debt ratios
are in Figure 14.
Figure 13: Stochastic Projections with Higher Base Productivity Growth Rate of 1.94 Per
Cent
Figure 14: Probability of Exceeding Debt Ratios with Higher Base Productivity Growth
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